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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it is intended to provide a historical context in 
which to understand the origins and the subsequent development of the juvenile justice 
system. The juvenile justice system has evolved amidst a changing social and legal 
landscape, and the system's high-minded ideals have oftentimes struggled to remain 
practical and even relevant in the face of new political and judicial decisions regarding 
the proper role and scope of a juvenile justice system. Second, this paper submits the 
idea that the effectiveness of juvenile justice, and the ideals upon which such a notion 
was founded, could best be realized via integration with the adult criminal justice system. 
It will argue that the adult court has already demonstrated an ability to provide flexible 
and creative solutions in dealing with juvenile offenders. The juvenile justice system has 
been subjected to a high level of scrutiny and almost uninterrupted tweaking since its 
inception in 1899; perhaps its gradual abolition has really been a century in the making. 
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Introduction 
An examination of today' s juvenile justice system typically brings up a 
dichotomous mix of inspiring ideology and disheartening reality. The juvenile justice 
system emerged as a byproduct of a significant change in cultural ideas that accompanied 
the modernization and industrialization of more than a century ago: namely, that children 
were innocent, dependent, and vulnerable. Progressive era reformers advanced this new 
imagery of childhood, which would dramatically alter a young person's supposed moral 
responsibility in committing delinquent acts. When a child did commit a crime, he or she 
was also seen as being a morally malleable entity, capable of benefiting from a 
compassionate system which would be committed to a youth's growth and development. 
As admirable and benevolent as this paradigm shift was, however, history quickly reveals 
a record of the juvenile court system's failings to live up to its rehabilitative ideal. 
Indeed, it is even debatable as to how "compassionate" the system ever was. 
When discussing the motivations for establishing a separate justice system for young 
people, two vastly different explanations emerge. One explanation points to a society 
with a burgeoning social conscience and rising awareness regarding the "inequities of a 
system of retributive criminal justice" (Tenney, 1969). This point of view contends that 
the United States, particularly in urban areas, was quickly developing a social conscious 
that was outpacing the existing institutions. As such, new institutions had to be created 
and new strategies had to be developed in order to head off "debilitating frustration and 
despair" (Tenney, 1969). 'New institutions' manifested themselves in the form ofa 
juvenile justice system that was formulated around the rehabilitative ideal. The Industrial 
Revolution had fed the trend of urbanization, and while the Industrial Revolution was the 
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impetus for unprecedented economic growth in the United States, it also produced 
"onerous working conditions, poverty, vice, and crime as well" (Tenney, 1969). It 
became the life's work of many progressive-era reformers to correct these new social ills; 
journalists, activists, and politicians were all part of a coalition to transform this troubling 
new social landscape. 
For as benign as the first explanation is, however, there exists an equally notable 
assertion that explains the advent of the juvenile justice system in terms of middle-class 
anxiety and social control. In his Pulitzer Prize-winning work The Age of Reform: From 
Bryan to F.D.R., author Richard Hofstadter argues that a large portion of the Progressive 
leadership were progressives 
"not because of economic deprivations but primarily because they were victims of a upheaval in status that 
took place in the United States during the closing decades of the nineteenth and the early years of the 
twentieth century. Progressivism, in short, was to a very considerable txtent led by men who suffered from 
the events of their time not through a shrinkage of their means but through the changed pattern in the 
distribution of deference and power." (Hofstadter, 1955) 
Hofstadter is referencing a position which maintains that many progressive-era reformers 
feared that social unrest could destroy their authority. Beginning with the Industrial 
Revolution, those in positions of economic power began to fear that the urban masses 
would destroy the world they had built. Out of this atmosphere came demands that new 
action be taken to preserve social order (Krisberg & Austin, 1993). One such action, as 
Hofstadter and others argue, was to institute a system of juvenile justice by which the 
state would be enabled to extend the long arm of the law into the homes of these "urban 
masses" and exercise control over their children. Doing so was seen as an effective way 
of combating a decline in both deference and power that had traditionally been allotted to 
the middle and upper-classes (Scott, 1959). And Chicago, more so than almost any other 
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American city, had experienced a great amount of economic and social upheaval 
resulting from the Industrial Revolution. 
A final theory offers a way to synthesize and even reconcile the social conscious 
vs. social control argument. It also offers a means of accounting for the diffusion of a 
juvenile justice system beyond the city of Chicago and the state of Illinois (after all, much 
ofthe rest of the nation adopted a version of the juvenile justice system in short order, 
and many of these states and cities were not as dramatically effected by the Industrial 
Revolution and economic explosion). John Sutton offers such a synthesis by writing that 
The new court [in Illinois] was an institutional compromise which drew on legal norms to provide a buffer 
of legitimacy within which discretionary social control activities ... could be continued. Outside Illinois, the 
juvenile court did not spread as an instrumental response to social disorganization, social movement power, 
or juvenile crime but as a symbol of commitment to inoffensive Progressivism and to a vague array of child 
welfare objectives. (Sutton, 1985). 
Between these several attempts to account for the birth of a national system of juvenile 
justice, perhaps at least one conclusion can be drawn: that is, that the advent of a juvenile 
justice system as a benign system which oversaw a radical transformation in the 
treatment of children is not a foregone description and rationalization of its early 
existence. The motivations may seem muddled and even contradictory. It was a system 
born without a cohesive directive, and today this lack of a well-articulated mandate is 
reflected in a want of both vision and purpose. The Progressive Era and the personalities 
who drove it have assumed an almost mythical quality over the past century, and perhaps 
the current juvenile justice system suffers expectations that are both overblown and 
misinformed. Expectations aside, however, the juvenile justice system still does not hold 
up to any reasonable standards of either justice or efficiency. For whatever the 
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motivations of the founders, they have bequeathed a system that now struggles, perhaps 
more so than ever, to justify its existence. 
Today, the public is all too familiar with the shortcomings of the juvenile justice 
system. A Time magazine article once referred to one city's juvenile courthouse as being 
filled with "halls of anguish." Sensational media coverage of juvenile crime, such as the 
spree of school shootings that seemed to endanger suburban schoolchildren in the mid-to-
late 1990s, serves to tum a harsh spotlight on the effectiveness of a separate court system 
for young offenders. According to a NBC News- Wall Street Journal poll, two-thirds of 
Americans think juveniles under age 13 who commit murder should be tried as adults 
(Associated Press, 1998). Indeed, in recent years both the general public as well as 
lawmakers have begun to question the wisdom of retaining a separate and independent 
juvenile justice system. 
What may be less obvious is that the states have gradually begun to chip away at 
the distinction between a juvenile and an adult offender, and that this trend has hugely 
important implications. No state retains an inviolable, legal distinction between the status 
of "juvenile" and "adult," and the age threshold for trial in adult courts seems to fall 
every time a new incident of juvenile violence captures the nation's attention (Butts & 
Harrell, 1998). Youth who violate the law are no longer guaranteed special treatment 
because of their age, and the day may come when a crime is a crime, regardless of the 
offender's age (Butts & Harrell, 1998). Even if states abolish the practice of sending 
young offenders to a separate court, however, children and adolescents will continue to 
be cognitively, emotionally, and socially different from adults (Butts & Harrell, 1998). 
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Before advocating the dismantling of the current juvenile justice system, it is 
important to understand a few of the particulars that characterize the system itself. This 
will help to understand why the adult criminal justice system is not currently equipped to 
handle an influx of new cases involving young people, and why specialized means for 
dealing with juvenile offenders need to be incorporated into the adult system. The 
current juvenile justice system allows for important distinctions to be made between the 
various young people who come under the court's jurisdiction-distinctions that the adult 
criminal justice system, at present, is not able to account for. Most importantly, the 
juvenile courts allow for a distinction to be made between juvenile status offenders and 
juvenile delinquent offenders. Essentially, a juvenile status offense is a crime which 
cannot be committed by adults (U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(c)(2)). For example, a juvenile may not 
run away from home, skip school, or be caught smoking or drinking alcohol-all acts 
which are not illegal if committed by someone over a particular age. Furthermore, the 
juvenile court system was established to deal with cases involving children who did not 
commit a crime at all; many courts are authorized to hear cases involving the termination 
of parental rights, abuse and neglect, adoption, child support, and the appointment of 
guardians. 
Although policymakers have been tweaking the system almost since the time of 
its inception, it is obvious that the juvenile court is still not living up to its promises. 
Considering the high level of public discontent, elected officials appear amenable to 
considering more significant adjustments to the system--or doing away with it 
altogether. Satisfactory answers, however, are not likely to be found in radical proposals 
to simply abolish the juvenile court and process all young offenders in regular court 
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(Butts & Harell, 1998). This paper argues that we need a new system of youth justice, 
and that policymakers need to have more options at their disposal that reach beyond total 
abolition or total integration with the adult system. After a historical overview of the 
circumstances and developments that have yielded the present system, this paper looks at 
the possible directions that a new youth court system might take, with a particular 
emphasis on incorporating specialized mechanisms for dealing with juvenile offenders, 
under the auspices of one single court system. Even under a unified justice system, 
punishment does not have to be the primary mandate. 
Historical BaCkground 
The Progressive Era 
The foundation of a separate court system for juvenile offenders is typically 
associated with Progressive Era reforms and the familiar personalities of Jane Addams 
and John Dewey--celebrated champions of both children's rights and human rights. The 
Progressive Era in American history is typically characterized by a belief in the 
obligation to intervene in economic and social affairs, and in the ability of civic activism 
to serve as a catalyst for improving conditions oflife in a new urban-industrial society, 
and especially in improving conditions for children. In addition to the establishment of 
separate courts for juvenile offenders, though, child labor laws and compulsory school 
attendance laws can also be seen as reflecting a new child-centric approach that 
characterized the Progressive Era (Wiebe, 1967). Illinois, in 1899, was the first state to 
establish a "children's court," which would be the predecessor and blueprint for the 
successive juvenile court systems that would eventually be established by all fifty states. 
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The stated goals of these early courts practically overflowed with benevolence and 
sympathy for "misguided" youth. Indeed, this new type of court was influenced on one 
hand by the growing notion that childhood was a uniquely distinct period of time in a 
person's life, and that children were fundamentally different from adults-not just 
physically different, but emotionally, socially, and developmentally distinct, as well. 
This was a new, more modem concept of childhood, where children were seen as 
dependent beings who were in need of extended preparation for life (Hawes & Hiner, 
1985). With this new view on the role of childhood in one's life came the idea that 
young people who violated the law should not be bound to the same strictures of justice 
as their adult counterparts. An offender's age was thought to correspond with his or her 
likelihood of being successfully rehabilitated. 
This shift in thinking concerning the nature of childhood influenced popular 
perceptions about juvenile crime and its causes. Formerly, both popular and learned 
opinion held that crime and deviance were products of "free-will" choices that people 
made; it followed that if one actively and consciously chose to commit a crime, then that 
person should suffer the consequences of such poor character and decision-making. 
Positive criminology, on the other hand, asserted that crime was determined rather than 
chosen. This shift meant a reduction in the focus on an actor's moral responsibility for 
crime, and therefore allowed for the focus to shift to the possibilities for reforming 
offenders, rather than punishing them (Feld, 1992). It is this idea of rehabilitation which 
was a founding principle of the children's courts, and which continues to serve as a 
primary justification for the continued existence of a separate juvenile court today. 
7 
Several other features of the early juvenile justice system also reinforced the 
distinct nature of the Court. Most importantly, the Court's jurisdiction reached far 
beyond youth who had committed a crime. The Court's mandate encompassed youths 
suffering from abuse, dependency, or neglect, as well as those charged with criminal 
offenses and non-criminal disobedience (Feld, 1992). Progressives invoked the legal 
doctrine of parens patriae to legitimize such wide-reaching intervention. Parens patriae, 
or the state as parent, refers to the power of the state to usurp the rights of the natural 
parent or legal guardian, and to act as the parent of any child whom the court deems as in 
need of protection. Indeed, as early as 1838, the Pennsylvania state supreme court was 
holding that the right of parental control, while a natural right, was not necessarily an 
inalienable right. In its decision in the case Ex parte Crouse, the state supreme court 
articulated its rationale for keeping children in the state's custody, despite parental 
objections: 
The object of the charity is refonnation, by training the inmates to industry; by imbuing their 
minds with principles of morality and religion; by furnishing them with means to earn a living; and, above 
all, by separating them from the corrupting influence of improper associates. To this end, may not the 
natural parents, when unequal to the task of education, or unworthy of it, be superseded by the parens 
patriae, or common guardian of the community? .. The infant has been snatched from a course which must 
have ended in confirmed depravity; and, not only is the' restraint of her person lawful, but it would have 
been an act of extreme cruelty to release her from it. 
When designing the juvenile justice system, the doctrine of parens patriae came 
at the expense of due process for juveniles. Because the goal of the new court was to 
rehabilitate offenders using the most flexible process possible for hearing and sentencing 
cases, due process was omitted to increase the informality and agility of proceedings. 
The juvenile court was also not envisioned as an adversarial court-another reason for 
omitting due process protections to young people. 
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A series oflegislative actions have brought the juvenile court together with 
various social service agencies, with the idea that together they will form a competent 
parenting team. This alliance, however, tends to be an uneasy one. By their nature, 
courts seek to hold individuals accountable for their actions, while social service agencies 
seek to modify those same actions and provide support (Cavanaugh-Stauts, 2000). This 
dichotomous relationship mirrors the sort of catch-22 in which the juvenile justice system 
frequently finds itself At times, it can seem as though the juvenile justice system has 
been charged with mutually exclusive aims: first, to rehabilitate delinquent youth with the 
hope that they can become successful and contributing members of society, but secondly, 
to ensure the safety of the general public. The first aim requires the support of and 
interaction with the general public, while the second necessitates that law-breaking youth 
be securely sequestered from the populace at large, in the name of public safety. 
Historically, then, the Juvenile Justice System has been tasked with being a little bit of 
everything to everybody. It serves as one part benevolent parent, one part authoritarian 
arbiter; it serves as a giver of second and third chances, but also as a final terminator of 
any opportunity for rehabilitation. 
Operating under such a variety of directives, it should come as little surprise that 
the Court has a mixed record when it comes to its history of successfully rehabilitating 
delinquent youths. From its inception, the Juvenile Justice System has not maintained the 
best record of using its jurisdiction for benign and therapeutic purposes. Several, more 
recent, developments have expanded the Court's propensity for dispensing punitive 
justice, but the Court itselfhas a long history of straying from its founding principles. 
Part of this trend stems from the fact that juvenile courts appeared to be endowed with 
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seemingly unlimited discretion. Although caseloads varied among jurisdictions, the 
volume of cases in the urban areas soon overwhelmed existing court resources, and 
judges became unable to give the close personal attention to each case advocated by the 
reformers. As little as ten minutes was devoted to each case as court calendars became 
increasingly crowded (Krisberg & Austin, 1993). Although the juvenile courts were 
established around the principle that youth delinquency could and should be dealt with on 
a case-by-case basis, such huge caseloads often meant that the quality of probationary 
supervision deteriorated and dispositions were hastily and indifferently meted out. More 
than a century later, an overwhelmingly voluminous caseload continues to saddle the 
effectiveness of the juvenile justice system. 
Although juvenile courts were founded in the spirit ofthe popular Progressive 
movement of the time, from its inception the juvenile court system has had a number of 
vocal opponents. The criticisms of one hundred years ago oftentimes mirror those that 
are raised today. Generally, the early opponents of the juvenile justice system opposed 
what they saw as an almost immediate betrayal of the ideals which the system was 
supposedly founded upon. Hearings that lasted as little as ten minutes could hardly be 
expected to provide an earnest examination of a child's specific circumstances and yield 
a thoughtful evaluation as to what would be in anyone's "best interests." Early on, too, 
opponents recognized the procedural problems that would come to dominate the 
discussion over the court's effectiveness. A defining feature of juvenile courts was that 
the "concept of justice was altered from adjudication of guilt to diagnosis of a condition" 
(Albanese, 1992). In wanting to exercise its power to "save" children, the court found 
that it was not in a youth's best interest to be subjected to a trial by jury. After all, if the 
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court was established for the purpose of salvation, and not punishment, then there was 
really no place for a body of one's peers to determine innocence or guilt. No effort of 
prosecution was being made~nly an effort to look at the best interests of the child, as a 
parent would (Albanese, 1992). As it became increasingly evident that the court was 
actually in the business of meting out punitive justice, and that youths were frequently 
being mistreated under the state's custody, the lack oflegal council and basic due process 
protections for juveniles began to stand out as an egregious violation of the purported aim 
to serve a child's "best interests." 
Juvenile Justice in the '60s and '70s: Revisiting Gault and Winship 
These long-stewing issues came to head in the late 1960s and early 1970s, in the 
form of cases argued before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court's decisions would 
significantly modify the original intent of the first juvenile court and the doctrine of 
parens patriae, as it was being invoked at the time. The way in which juveniles are 
handled in the present juvenile justice system would also be established. 
In re Gault 
The case of In re Gault, decided in 1967, would establish the right of juveniles to 
receive the full protection of the Constitution. Prior to the Gault decision, it was 
fundamentally assumed that there was no need for constitutional protection since the 
juvenile courts operated under the premise of parens patriae; as such, the state entrusted 
judges with the authority to rule in the best interest of the child (Houston and Barton, 
2005). Whereas the court system that deals with adult offenders is adversarial in nature, 
involving an accuser pitted against the accused, it was again the supposedly benign nature 
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of the juvenile system which justified the absence of the procedural protections 
guaranteed to adults. 
The facts of Gault revolve around a fifteen-year-old boy, Gerald Francis Gault, 
who was taken into custody by local police after a neighbor had filed a complaint with 
the local authorities, alleging that the boy and a friend had been making threatening and 
obscene phone calls to her at her home. Young Gault did have a previous juvenile 
record-earlier, he had been in the company of another young teen who had been found 
guilty of snatching a woman's wallet from her purse. Solely on the basis of this rather 
brief record, the juvenile court held that he was a delinquent and ordered him committed 
to the state industrial school until the age of twenty-one. Under the juvenile code at this 
time, Gerald Gault was not entitled to particular constitutional rights; namely, the right to 
be informed of the charges, the right to counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses, and protection against self-incrimination. It is especially import ant to note 
that, had Gault been over the age of 18 and committed the same offense, he would have 
either faced a fine of between $5.00 and $50.00 or a maximum of two months jail time. 
Gerald Gault's parents had to petition his release to the Arizona Supreme Court, 
because the younger Gault himself had no such right of appeal. When the case made its 
way to the United States Supreme Court, the Court held in an 8-1 decision that, indeed, 
Gerald Gault's commitment to Arizona's state industrial school" was a clear violation of 
his 14th Amendment due process rights, since he had been denied the rights to legal 
council, had not been formally notified of the charges against him, had not been informed 
of his right against self-incrimination (remain silent), had no opportunity to confront 
accusers and had been given no right to appeal his sentence to a higher court (U.S.S.C., 
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1967). Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart, however, wrote a dissenting opinion, 
where he maintained that the purpose of the juvenile court was correction, not 
punishment, and therefore the constitutional procedural safeguards for criminal trials do 
not actually apply to juvenile cases. In articulating his rational for voting contrary to the 
opinion of the other eight justices, Justice Stewart was holding fast to the historical and 
idealistic notion of a benign juvenile justice system which should continue to be entrusted 
with its paternalistic authorization to serve "in the best interest" of the child. What the 
Gault case represented, however, was just how far the actual juvenile justice system had 
strayed from its original intentions. In practice, the system was failing in its mission to 
serve this 'best interest.' The system could not live up to this purpose, so the 
Constitution would have to protect juveniles because the juvenile justice system was not. 
In re Winship 
The Winship case would come to affirm the rights of juveniles with regards to the 
role of the burden of proof in obtaining a conviction. As with the Gault case, Winship 
would wrestle with whether or not juvenile offenders were entitled to the full protections 
of the Constitution. Again, it had been fundamentally assumed that the answer was 'no'; 
if the juvenile court really isn't an adversarial system which hands out punishment, then 
the question of Constitutional protections is practically moot. The facts and events of In 
re Winship, however, would again demonstrate that the punishment ethic was very much 
at work in the juvenile justice system. 
The facts of In re Winship center around a twelve-year-old boy from New York 
(Winship), who was taken into custody for allegedly stealing $112 from a woman's 
pocketbook. In the juvenile court hearing, the judge actually acknowledged that the 
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proof against Winship wasn't entire conclusive-meaning that it didn't constitute proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 'Proofbeyond a reasonable doubt' is the standard for 
securing a conviction in a criminal matter, but at this time juvenile hearings were 
considered civil matters. As such, a conviction in a civil matter only required that "a 
preponderance ofthe evidence" be obtained-hence a higher burden of proof is not 
necessary. Had Winship been an adult accused of stealing $112 dollars, however, it 
would have been necessary to demonstrate proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Winship 
was found guilty of the offense under the "preponderance of the evidence" standard, 
though, and placed in a training school for boys for an initial period of eighteen months, 
subject to annual extensions until he reached the age of majority at eighteen years of age 
(Albanese, 1993). Because Winship was only twelve at the time, he effectively received 
a six-year sentence. 
When heard before the Supreme Court, the case presented the question of whether 
or not "proof beyond a reasonable doubt was essential to the fair treatment of a juvenile 
charged with an act that would be a crime if committed by an adult" (Albanese, 1993). 
The Court agreed with Winship's claim that such proofwas essential. The Court's 
decision held that when a juvenile is charged with an act that would be considered if 
committed by an adult, then every element of the offense must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
Like the Gault case, though, the Court's decision was not unanimous. Of 
particular importance is the way in which the purpose and philosophy of the juvenile 
justice system was debated between the Supreme Court justices in delivering their 
various opinions. With the Winship decision, it was clear that the juvenile justice system 
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was being evaluated from both a practical and a philosophical standpoint. In a 
concurring opinion, Justice John Marshall Harlan II wrote that he hoped the higher 
burden of proof would not eclipse the rehabilitative mission of the court. He wrote that 
he hoped the procedural constraints would not "(1) interfere with the worthy goal of 
rehabilitating the juvenile, or (2) burden the juvenile courts with a procedural 
requirement that will make juvenile adjudications significantly more time consuming, or 
rigid" (397 U.S. 358, 1970). Justices Warren Burger and Potter Stewart dissented to the 
decision, arguing that they felt as though the rehabilitative ideal had been effectively 
done away with, in favor of treating juvenile offenders in the same manner as adult 
criminals. They wrote that they hoped the decision of In re Winship would not "spell the 
end of a generously conceived program of compassionate treatment intended to mitigate 
the rigors and traumas of exposing youthful offenders to a traditional criminal court" 
(397 U.S. 358, 1970). What the justices failed to confront was the question of which was 
more harmful: to expose juvenile offenders to the adult system of criminal courts, or to 
leave young offenders effectively exposed to what was becoming the full thrust of the 
law in juvenile matters, and without the Constitutional protections of their adult 
counterparts. 
Juvenile Justice in the 1980s and 1990s: Youth Crime and the "Get Tough" Movement 
The most recent development in the history of the juvenile justice system came 
with the "Get Tough" movement that characterized much of juvenile justice policy in the 
1980s and '90s. While this movement also influenced the criminal justice system at 
large, its effects were particularly staggering for the juvenile popUlation. Indeed, this era 
in juvenile justice has probably been the most conservative since before the time of the 
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inception of the juvenile court system in the late nineteenth century. Here, deterrence and 
especially punishment have been emphasized as the new goals of the juvenile court. The 
movement really got underway in 1976, when over half the states made it easier to 
transfer youths to adult courts, and other states stiffened penalties for juvenile offenders 
via mandatory minimum sentencing guidelines (Krisberg & Austin, 1993). From 1979-
1984, the number of juveniles sent to adult prisons rose by 48% (Krisberg & Austin, 
1993). Individual states seemed to think that if young offenders were now entitled to 
receive the same Constitutional protections as adults, then they were also liable to be 
subjected to the very same institutions and sentencing procedures as the adult criminal 
population. 
The genesis for this reform came from several places. First, there was the 
allegation that the juvenile justice system was being too lenient with dangerous offenders. 
During this time period, the media latched onto several high-profile cases which seemed 
to reveal an epidemic of felonious youth running awry throughout the United States. 
Indeed, the raw numbers seemed to corroborate the sense that youth violence was 
spiraling out of control. From the mid-1980s through the mid-1990s, homicides by 
juveniles tripled, juvenile arrests for aggravated assault went up 78 percent, law 
enforcement officials identified 14% of violent crimes in America as having been 
committed by a juvenile, and juvenile arrests for robbery went up 63 percent (Fox, 1996). 
Such raw numbers, however, can be deceiving. Between 1997 and 1998, Americans 
were terrified at what seemed to be an epidemic of schoolyard killings, including the 
Columbine High School massacre. While such stories were both highly disturbing and 
highly sensational, they obscured the fact that school killings had actually gone down 
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45% since 1992. Furthermore, the previous escalation in juvenile violence turned out to 
be very highly concentrated. For example, one-third ofthe juvenile homicides that took 
place in 1995 occurred in just ten counties in the United States, according to the Bureau 
of Justice Statistics. Eighty-four percent of the nation's counties had no juvenile 
homicides whatsoever (Lotke & Schiradeli, 1996). The bottom line seems to be that 
policymakers were put in a tough position: raw data certainly seemed to indicate the 
likelihood of a vast moral vacuum amongst juveniles. This could have fueled the rush to 
abandon all methods of fighting juvenile crime save one--prosecution in adult courts and 
incarceration in adult prisons (Elikann, 1999). 
Such data would have certainly informed public opinion regarding youth in 
general. In 1997, one poll noted that 61 % of adult Americans thought that the lack of 
values among young people was a serious problem (Associated Press, 1997). There 
emerged a real fear that young people ''were so lacking in remorse, conscience, and 
feeling that they've become a dangerous and lethal menace" (Elikann, 1999). Taken 
together, this negative public attitude towards youth can mean that there is little public 
resistance or outcry when juveniles are transferred into the adult criminal justice system, 
or when a 14-year-old first-time offender is locked up next to a 34-year-old hardened 
criminal. 
Perhaps most importantly as far as the future of the juvenile justice system is 
concerned, the most strident advocates of the "get tough" movement have called for the 
complete abolition of a separate court for young offenders. This voice argues that the 
juvenile courts are unwilling to protect juvenile rights, unable to protect juvenile rights, 
or a combination of both (Elrod & Ryder, 1999). Although this particular movement in 
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juvenile justice policy appeared to lose momentum by the beginning of the twenty-first 
century, it has left the system in something of a lurch. "Getting tough" ended up 
resulting in a greatly increased incarceration rate for young people, overwhelming 
existing facilities and service providers but doing little to address the problem of juvenile 
delinquency. It has left the juvenile justice system itself in something of an identity 
crisis, struggling to reassert its relevance in the twenty-first century. 
Over the course of about a century, the ideology of the juvenile justice system has 
changed, and policy has adapted to shifting views on the nature and causes of juvenile 
delinquency, and as to how such children in need should be dealt with. From the time 
that children began to be treated differently than adult offenders in 1899, to the 
introduction of Constitutional due process to the juvenile justice system in the 1960s and 
1970s, and to the era of the early 1990s when the juvenile justice system was 
characterized by uncertain goals and programs (relying heavily on punishment and 
deterrence), children have been confronted with a system that has been inconsistent at 
best, and blatantly detrimental at worst. Today, the system is striving to give attention to 
strategy that focuses on reducing the threat of juvenile crime and expanding options for 
handling juvenile offenders. Emphasis is being placed on "what works", and an effort is 
made to utilize the restorative justice model, which involves balancing the needs of the 
victim, the community, and the juvenile (Siegel & Senna, 2000). 
Step 1 in Court Reform: What are we up against? 
In instituting any type of meaningful reform, then, what are the basic deficiencies 
in the present setup of the juvenile justice system that need to be addressed? In brief, 
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four basic inadequacies can be identified (although many, many more could certainly be 
recognized). Essentially, the current system is plagued by past reform initiatives that 
proved to be anticlimactic; a paucity of funding; a lack of uniformity that yields 
confusion, frustration, and disparate outcomes; and the possibility that inherent 
contradictions within the juvenile justice system itself have destined the court for failure. 
One complaint seems to be that we continue to experience more of the same. 
Barry Feld, author of numerous works on the juvenile justice system, noted almost 
seventeen years ago that "after more than two decades of constitutional and legislative 
reform, juvenile courts continue to deflect, co-opt, ignore, or absorb ameliorative 
tinkering with minimal institutional change" (Feld, 1991). More than three decades after 
In re Gault was decided by the Supreme Court, University of Chicago law professor 
Emily Buss concluded that the decision amounted to little more than a "botched rescue" 
that "foreclosed any thoughtful consideration of the changes required to make the 
juvenile justice system fair to children" (Buss, 2003). She goes on to add that the direct 
product of Gault is a "set of rights ill-tailored to serve either the aims of the juvenile 
justice system or the interests of the children who hold those rights." Both Feld and Buss 
are driving at two notions in particular: one, that the juvenile justice system is stubbornly 
resistant to change and two, that the reform measures that have thus far been 
implemented have not been successful in pushing the system in a direction which would 
ensure efficiency and fairness to the children involved. 
No discussion of the current woes ofthe juvenile justice system is complete 
without lamenting the bare-bones budget on which most juvenile courts around the 
country operate. The problems associated with inadequate funding manifest themselves 
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in most aspects of juvenile court proceedings. Courts can be understaffed and lack 
adequate and up-to-date systems for records keeping. Inadequate and inappropriate 
physical space presents another challenge. Judge David Mitchell, formerly ofthe 
Baltimore, Maryland juvenile court system, lobbied his city to erect a new courthouse 
that would provide a "humane and empathetic" atmosphere for children (Mitchell, 1996). 
Employees of the system and its adjuncts are underpaid, and caseworkers are 
overwhelmed. In some areas, it can take between six to nine months before a case is 
heard before a judge, based largely on a system that grants extended delays which 
aggravate the preexisting backlog of cases. This only serves to frustrate the mission of 
the juvenile court because, in order for delinquent behavior to be effectively corrected, 
the juvenile must be able to experience a link between his behavior and the punishment 
that he receives. 
The juvenile justice system also lacks any sense of overriding uniformity. 
Perhaps this is permissible on a national level; after all, the term 'juvenile justice system" 
may be something of a misnomer. The term is correct insofar as it applies to the 
individual fifty states-juvenile court systems are largely beholden to state and local 
authority, as opposed to federal. As such, fifty separate juvenile justice systems will 
inevitably yield a disparity of outcomes. Granted, this is a problem which is not unique 
to juvenile justice. Within states, however, treatment of children within the juvenile 
justice system can seem almost laughable arbitrary. An evaluation of the juvenile court 
in Phoenix, Arizona revealed that for the crime of burglary, one youth was sentenced to 
serve a one-year term in a state juvenile facility, another was fined $400, another was 
placed on probation, and yet the case of another was transferred to the adult criminal 
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court system (O'Hare, 2005). Achieving a sense ofunifonnity in sentencing outcomes 
becomes even more imperative when one considers that justice doesn't appear to be 
blind-poor and minority youth are frequently the recipients of the harshest penalties. 
While this disparity in outcomes also characterizes the adult justice system, at the 
juvenile level it does highlight just how far the system has strayed from any rehabilitative 
ideal. 
Finally, the juvenile justice system seems to be burdened by its inherent 
contradictions. Was the court simply bound to be ineffective because of its original 
design? Again, Barry Feld raises concerns about the overall usefulness of the court's 
traditional design, arguing that "the fundamental shortcoming of the juvenile court's 
welfare idea reflects a failure of conception and not simply a century-long failure of 
implementation" (Feld, 1999). He goes on to maintain that, while the juvenile court 
creators envisioned a social service agency that functioned in a judicial setting, 
combining social welfare and penal social control functions in one agency ensures that 
juvenile courts do both badly. Should providing for child welfare be a social 
responsibility as opposed to a judicial one? After all, states typically don't bring 
juveniles to court because they need social services-it is because they committed a 
crime. This dissatisfaction with the organizational structure of the juvenile justice system 
is important largely because abolitionists frequently cite this grievance when arguing for 
the complete dismantling of the system and an integration with the adult criminal justice 
system. 
Towards a "Middle Road" in Juvenile Justice Reform 
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Two things seem apparent in this debate. The first is that the juvenile justice 
system cannot continue to operate in its present state and organization. The second is that 
reformers seem to be grouped into two distinct camps: those in favor of restoring the 
rehabilitative ideal and restoring strict autonomy within the present juvenile justice 
system, and those who advocate a complete merger with the adult criminal justice 
system, with a focus on punishment. In the midst of this debate, though, it is important to 
keep in mind one thing that all sides seem to agree upon. Although the rehabilitative 
versus punitive advocates will clash, both groups are still in agreement as to the 
fundamental principles of developmental psychology upon which the juvenile court was 
founded. Most reformers, of whatever persuasion, will still agree that juveniles, "because 
of their developmental differences, are less responsible for their actions than adults and 
should be punished differently from adults who commit the same criminal acts" 
(Geraghty & Drizin, 1997). It is the opinion of many that even the adult justice system 
can incorporate ways to accommodate these "differences." It may be suggested, as many 
have already done, that the juvenile justice system is ineffective due in part to the fact 
that it may have been ill-conceived and misguided. Ifwe accept the idea that the juvenile 
justice system was founded out of benevolence and a genuine concern for child welfare, 
then we may still applaud and admire these noble principles, for surely they point to a 
very highly evolved social conscience within society at that time. Still, however, the fact 
remains that the court's execution has fallen far short of its ideal. Here, we may propose 
that a new justice process be designed for young offenders within the existing criminal 
courts system. It may be equally naive and idealistic to assume that the judges and 
prosecutors of the current adult justice system will desire to handle very young offenders 
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differently. But while there exists a consensus regarding the emotional and social 
differences that separate adolescents and adults, it is reasonable to hope that a single 
justice system can make adequate accommodation. 
How, then, should such an integration take place? Jeffrey Butts and Adele Harrell 
of the Crime Policy Report suggest that "the work to design a new youth justice system 
should start before states actually begin to abolish the legal concept of delinquency" 
(Butts & Harrell, 1998). They suggest that we consider what would be the best court 
process for adjudicating and sentencing young offenders. As the situation currently 
stands, the adult court system is not prepared to deal with an influx of young people. It 
should be clarified that a type of juvenile court could and probably would still exist even 
if cases involving law violations were removed. Doing away with the delinquency 
jurisdiction of the juvenile court does not mean that a juvenile court could no longer hear 
cases involving abused and neglected children, truants, or divorce and custody disputes. 
They would simply no longer handle criminal law violations by minors (Butts & Harrell, 
1998). 
As Butts and Harrell succinctly point out, the debate between juvenile court 
preservationists and abolitionists could be characterized as a fight between the "naIve" 
and the "reckless." In trying to achieve a middle ground in the past, Simon Singer points 
out that politicians have tried to "criminalize" the juvenile court (Singer, 1996). It seems 
that very few have suggested or even realized the possibility that the "adult" criminal 
justice system could actually be adequately accommodating to underage offenders, and 
that several such accommodations are already functioning at present. For example, 
"Abolition of the delinquency jurisdiction would not require that all young offenders be sent to adult 
prison. Many states already operate separate correctional facilities for young adults (under age 21, under 
23, etc.). The decision to handle all young offenders in the criminal court would not prevent such 
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correctional specialization. States would still be free to separate offenders by age when incarcerating or 
otherwise supervising convicted offenders, and the Federal government would still be free to require such 
separation as a condition of financial support for state corrections agencies." (Butts & Harrell, 1998) 
We can see that it probably is not rational to assume that a fourteen-year-old will be 
incarcerated alongside a hardened and lifelong criminal if the juvenile and adult justice 
systems undergo some sort of a merger. An even larger issue, though, concerns what 
would happen to the vast array of agencies and services that currently exist to serve 
delinquent youth. Several extraordinarily bright and hardworking professionals have 
dedicated their careers to working with juvenile offenders and their social, emotional, and 
educational needs. The systems of juvenile probation and juvenile corrections could 
continue to exist, along with these other services, regardless as to whether the offending 
juveniles are subject to the juvenile court's delinquency jurisdiction. Essentially, the 
youth offender programs that operate now could continue to operate; the only difference 
would be that client referrals would come from the adult criminal justice system. 
Perhaps the most valuable ideal from the foundation of the juvenile justice system 
that should be retained is the idea of flexibility in dealing with delinquent youth. Here, 
the idea of flexible sentencing does not have to be mutually exclusive with an adult 
justice system that has jurisdiction over cases involving law-breaking youth. It is hardly 
a foregone conclusion that hearing juvenile cases in adult court will mean that an 11-
year-old vandal and a 17-year-old murderer will now be treated under the same 
processes. Ifwe look closely, we can see plenty of instances where the courts have 
demonstrated an ability to move beyond "one-size-fits-all" processes. 
Alternative court models that exist under the banner of the adult criminal justice 
system may provide a sensible answer for dealing with youth crime. Examples of such 
"alternative courts" include drug courts, gun courts, community-based courts, and more. 
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These more specialized courts are designed to work with offenders regardless of age, but 
because they are relatively decentralized and those referred to them have committed a 
particular type of crime, such courts may offer the flexibility and creativity in dealing 
with offenders that is so valued within the current juvenile justice system. Drug courts, 
spearheaded by initiatives in Miami, Florida, have proven to be models of both 
effectiveness and flexibility. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, ''judges, 
prosecutors, defenders, and drug treatment specialists work as a team to ensure offender 
outcomes, and drug courts offer legal incentives such as deferred prosecution for drug 
defendants willing to participate in treatment programs." 
In addition to an alternative like the very specific drug court, several other 
alternative court models exist that include a wide variety of offenses under their 
umbrellas. Teen courts, community courts, and alternative dispute resolution are all 
methods for providing an element of individualization to youths who find themselves in 
the criminal justice system. Teen courts, particularly en vogue over the past decade, 
provide a "voluntary, non-judicial alternative for youths charged with minor law 
violations. Rather than going before a judge in a traditional court, young people referred 
to teen courts have their fate decided by other young people" (Godwin & Steinhart, 
1996). While the effectiveness of such courts has been called into question, teen courts 
are important in that they highlight the ability of the justice system to formulate 
alternative models of justice that are particularly tailored to young people. Perfection in 
corrections and criminal justice is likely to always be fleeting, but innovation should 
always be prized. A new model for organizing youth offenders within the adult justice 
system might look as follows: 
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Source: Torbet, P. et al. (1996). State responses to serious and violent juvenile crime. 
Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. 
This reorganization does offer a response to a few ofthe barriers to reform that 
have been previously cited. Barry Feld, a long-time critic of the current makeup ofthe 
juvenile justice system, has often criticized the juvenile court for undergoing seemingly 
endless "tinkering" while failing to undergo even "minimal institutional change." 
Indeed, Feld has criticized the juvenile court on the grounds that it has been turned into 
"a scaled-down, second-class, criminal court" (Feld, 1993). Those who agree with Feld 
would find the maintenance of a separate juvenile justice system to be indefensible. 
From these court alternatives, whose use in cases involving juvenile is strongly advocated 
by Jeffrey Butts and Adele Harrell, hopefully a new and more diverse system of juvenile 
justice could eventually be constructed. This new construction might also satisfy Feld 
and those who believe that the juvenile justice system has suffered for more than a 
century from a general failure of conception. 
In advocating for something of a 'middle ground' in juvenile justice reform, 
juveniles might finally achieve some standard of uniformity in court proceedings. Well 
before the decisions of Gault and Winship were handed down, court reformers were 
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agitating for the adoption of constitutional standards of due process in order to assure 
fairer judicial treatment for juveniles (Ketcham, 1977). Several commentators on the 
juvenile court, including Monrad Paulsen, had written about the legal flaws in the use of 
the parens patriae doctrine prior to Gault and Winship. Indeed, when the Supreme Court 
eventually mandated certain constitutional protections to juveniles in the Gault case of 
1967, the Court agreed with Paulson and cited his articles in eight footnotes (Ketcham, 
1977). For the landmark decision that Gault was, however, the case has also been called 
a "missed opportunity" (Buss, 2003). In explaining this characterization of the Supreme 
Court's decision, Emily Buss writes that, 
"in assuming that children's due process rights would, at best, match those of adults, the Court foreclosed 
any thoughtful consideration of the changes required to make the juvenile justice system fair to children. 
The direct product of Gault is a set of rights ill-tailored to serve either the aims of the juvenile justice 
system or the interests of the children who hold those rights. More broadly, Gault's error helped establish a 
pattern of analysis which has stunted the development of children's constitutional rights overall." (Buss, 
2003: 39) 
Buss goes on to contend that while children need to be ensured of constitutionally 
protected procedural rights, it would be inappropriate to try and graft the adult version of 
due process directly onto the situations of juveniles. She argues instead for "procedural 
adaptations" that would fit the "special context" of a juvenile court. 
Empirical and evaluative research seems to corroborate the feeling that Gault has 
failed to deliver on its promises. Barry Feld, one of the most prolific writers on the 
juvenile justice system, has concluded that, even in the post-Gault era, juveniles receive 
the worst of both worlds. He writes, "Most states do not provide youths with either 
procedural safeguards equivalent to those of adult criminal defendants or with special 
procedures that more adequately protect them from their own immaturity" (Feld, 1995). 
Considering that their appears to be at least one viable way of integrating juvenile justice 
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into the adult system, is the continued operation of a separate juvenile justice system 
justifiable? 
Conclusion and Observations 
Over the course of its century-long history, the juvenile justice system has 
evolved within an interesting legal and cultural framework. Due process for juvenile 
offenders appears to have been omitted from the "children's court" by design. To that 
'design', however, can be ascribed particular motivations. On the one hand, due process 
could have been omitted out of a genuine conviction regarding the non-adversarial nature 
of the juvenile court-an unnecessary hindrance to a system designed for maximum 
creative and discretionary freedom in rehabilitating delinquent youth. Conversely, it 
could be argued that a lack of due process in the juvenile justice system was yet another 
manifestation of the urban middle classes' attempt to exercise and regain control over a 
new industrial society that they perceived as slipping further and further away from their 
ability to exert influence. Either explanation, though, still leaves a court without due 
process by intention. This is one of the primary flaws of design that Barry Feld laments, 
and is frequently cited when accounting for the ineffectiveness ofthe juvenile justice 
system. Perhaps this original lack of due process made it inevitable that, almost since the 
court's inception in 1899, the higher courts and the Supreme Court would have to 
consistently move towards rectifying such an omission. Perhaps the juvenile justice 
system is the proverbial house built upon sand, destined to give way as a result of its own 
structural weakness. 
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Culturally, the environment has also shifted since the time of John Dewey, Jane 
Addams, and the Progressive movement. Today, there are new ideas about the role that 
government should play in response to crime, conflict, and trouble (Bazemore, 1999). 
Gordon Bazemore offers a summary of these shifting tides when he writes, 
"Indeed, most baby boomers and older generations can recall a time when adults in their communities took 
responsibility for looking after and imposing informal controls on neighborhood children other than their 
own. Moreover, there were numerous informal means of resolving disputes and disturbances peacefully, as 
well as mechanisms for sanctioning behavior that exceeded tolerance limits without recourse to formal 
court processes. In effect, community members, with the encouragement and support of schools, 
neighborhood police, and other institutions, often took care of problems that now end up in juvenile and 
criminal justice systems." (Bazemore, 1999: 83) 
The founders of the juvenile justice system obviously envisioned a role for government in 
the rehabilitation of wayward youth, but it is worthwhile to wonder if they would have 
been able to foresee just how many young people would come to pass through the 
system. Has the sheer number of juveniles in the system compromised court's ability to 
be flexible, creative, and benign? While it is difficult to detennine how the amount of 
traffic in the juvenile justice system has or has not compromised the court's original 
vision, it seems certain that the court will not be experiencing a decrease in its docket 
load any time soon. The public seems to have an expectation that courts, and especially 
the juvenile court, exist to solve any myriad number of conflicts which may present 
themselves. It is a shift towards an ever-increasing litigious paradigm that was not nearly 
as pronounced over a century ago. 
Today, neither policy makers nor the general public are too pleased with the 
current direction of the juvenile justice system. The system rightfully struggles to justify 
its own existence. An integration into the adult criminal justice system may irretrievably 
compromise the original vision of the juvenile justice system, but it was a vision that was 
never capable of being realized under the original design of the children's court. Viable 
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alternatives for achieving due process and justice for juveniles within an adult system do 
exist-alternatives that are by no means exclusively punitive and without consideration 
of the personal circumstances and rehabilitative needs of the juvenile. Reformers should 
not hesitate to initiate a process of integration with the adult court and gradually do away 
with the juvenile court's delinquency jurisdiction. "Abolition" does not have to be a 
dirty, heartless word. Indeed, such a radical reformation of the juvenile justice system 
may actually be in line with the progressive ideals of the "child savers" who are 
oftentimes credited with the idea of a children's court. Today's reformers, like those of 
more than a century ago, still desire to realize the best means of achieving justice and fair 
treatment for young people. 
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